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10 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CIA Reaction to General Maxwell Taylor's
Report on the U. S. Counterinsurgency
Program

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) concluded at its 26 July 1966 meeting that member agencies should review those Taylor Committee reports relevant to their responsibilities with the object of adopting any recommendations therein found to be desirable and feasible. No formal report has been requested by the President or the SIG. This memorandum, however, reviews CIA's reactions to the Taylor Report to date and presents certain comments on it.
3. The principal result of General Taylor's review of the U. S. counterinsurgency program was the new concept of centralized direction and responsibility for U. S. interdepartmental activities overseas, expressed in NSAM #341, and the establishment of the SIG and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's) as the Washington mechanisms for review and coordination of that effort. Other recommendations of General Taylor to the President were contained in an Annex to his report, entitled "Areas of Possible Deficiencies in Countersubversion Plans and Programs" and in the full reports of General Taylor's four working committees. Action responsibilities arising from these reports for member agencies, including CIA, and certain interdepartmental committees were combined with the unfinished business of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) and were reviewed and approved by the SIG at its 26 July 1966 meeting.
4. The annexes to this memorandum report what CIA has done or is doing to put into effect those recommendations of General Taylor's and his four committees which, in CIA's opinion,

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
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are "desirable and feasible" and to accomplish those responsibilities assigned by the SIG. The reports and a compilation of comments on them by CIA components are available in the Office of the Clandestine Services/Special Group Officer.

5. In summary, General Taylor's report emphasizes the need for early recognition by the U. S. of areas of potential subversive aggression and, in cooperation with local governments, initiating immediate and decisive action to destroy the subversive base for the aggression and to eliminate the root causes which foster the subversion--before it can be turned back only by expensive military counteraction. This has long been a CIA contention

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CONCUR:

SIGNED

Deputy Director for Plans

/s/ R. J. Smith

Deputy Director for Intelligence

SIGNED Alan M. Warfield

Deputy Director for Support

Deputy Director for Science & Technology

22 Sept 66
Date

30 SEP 1966

Date

4 OCT 1966

Date

6 OCT 1966

Date

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(Policy, Organization, Plans and Programs)

CIA Member: J. C. King

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The Committee believes that U. S. policy must continue to strengthen the governments the U. S. is supporting in the eyes of their own people by increasing their ability to survive by their own means; and that continued improvement is required in the implementation of U. S. counterinsurgency policies although no drastic changes in those policies are required.

2. The Committee commented that the coordination of covert activities with other programs in the field of counterinsurgency appears satisfactory.



4. Organizations and procedural recommendations of this Committee relative to the direction of the U. S. counterinsurgency program and the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) were overtaken by the promulgation of NSAM #341.

5. Recommendations by this Committee concerning the revision of the Overseas Internal Defense Plan, the adequacy of counterinsurgency plans, and for further study of the [redacted] assistance programs, the role and concept of civic action in nation building, and the need for a "watch list" on insurgency were incorporated in the action responsibilities assigned by SIG at its 26 July 1966 meeting.

CIA Comments and Action

1. As a result of the new mechanism established by NSAM #341, CIA components now look to an earlier and more rapid U. S. response to indications of subversive aggression.

2. The CS [redacted] is representing CIA with G/PM of State in early, informal discussions concerned with a revision of the O.I.D.P.

3. The CS Area Division Chiefs, as members of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's), will participate in the review of internal defense planning for each country; the review of the need for and adequacy of [REDACTED] programs; and the development of monthly "watch lists" of insurgency by geographic regions.

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(Counterinsurgency Training in U. S. Government Agencies)

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CIA Member:

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The 41 conclusions and 40 recommendations are concerned principally with the need for improvement of training and doctrine in the civilian agencies, except for CIA--whose training programs are commended; with improvement of the National Interdepartmental Seminar (NIS) and interdepartmental exchanges of training doctrine and materials; compliance by member agencies with NSAM #283, the "training NSAM"; and reactivation of the interagency training committee.

2. With regard to CIA, it recommends that (a) within the bounds of security, CIA should make its training facilities available to selected members of other departments and agencies; (b) CIA's career development and personnel management programs be made available in unclassified form for use by other agencies;

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CIA Comments and Action

1. The SIG re-established the Committee on Training, under the Chairmanship of the Director of the Foreign Service Institute. The Director of Training has been designated the CIA member. All of the recommendations of Committee II, including those noted above relative to CIA, are to be reviewed by the Committee on Training which will report to the SIG.

2. With regard to improvement of the NIS, CIA recently has revised its contribution to the curriculum to reflect the lessons it has learned in combatting insurgency in countries such as Vietnam, Laos and the Congo at the Phase I and II levels, particularly in rural areas and among primitive peoples. Further, a more careful application of NSAM #283 has raised the level of the CIA attendees.

3. Regarding the opening of CIA training in counterinsurgency to personnel from other U. S. agencies, the Director of Training has not recommended any change in the present policy, which is not to do so, because of the difficulty of teaching Clan-

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destine Services techniques in this and related areas with outsiders present. Although the Director of Training does not recommend that CIA do so at present, CIA has and could again give a training program for non-Agency personnel only.

4. The DDP believes that the resolution of the CIA role with respect to the training [REDACTED] [REDACTED] can best be handled on a case-by-case basis rather than through an early effort to recast NSAM #182.

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Committee III Report

(Resources for Averting or Suppressing Subversive Aggression)

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CIA Member:

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The general conclusion is made that resources, particularly manpower, being made available from indigenous and U. S. sources to avert or suppress subversive aggression are inadequate and are likely to remain so without a powerful motivating thrust from the President, followed by a closely coordinated program vigorously carried out by responsible agencies.

2. The major organizational and procedural recommendations made by the Committee were achieved by the promulgation of NSAM #341. Many of its recommendations concerning current programming procedures (for MAP, AID, etc.); the lack of flexibility of funding and contingency operations; the interplay of AID's nation-building programs and the MAP will necessarily be considered by the several interagency groups which will soon report to the SIG on the civic action concept, adequacy of police programs, research and development in countersubversion, and the consolidation and integration of country policy and planning programming papers, including the Internal Defense Plan concept.

3. The Committee recommends that priority be given to the rapid development of top quality police forces in vulnerable countries, and in doing so, points up the need to solve the ills of the U. S. public assistance program, i. e., lack of police advisor personnel; need for flexibility in funding and greater resources to assist police forces abroad; cooperation between DOD elements and AID police assistance activities; and need for review of the relationship of military and police forces supported by the U. S. in individual countries.

CIA Comments and Action

1. A representative of TSD/DDP, with support from DDS&T and is participating on the re-established interagency committee on R&D for countersubversion requirements. The responsibility for assuring progress in R&D for countersubversion lies with DOD and CIA. However, the SIG directed DOD to determine, in consultation in this Committee with CIA, State and USIA, (a) whether the military hardware needs are being adequately met

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and (b) whether drawing up a separate package for procurement and R&D as a better way of assuring adequate budgetary support for countersubversion needs is feasible and desirable. The Committee is to report to the SIG by 1 October 1966.

4. Relative to the Report on Resources, CIA has been tasked by the SIG with the responsibility for assignments of qualified counterinsurgency skills to impending crisis areas. Primarily this means CIA personnel for CIA participation in projects in primitive areas [redacted] Committee III pointed out the great need for-and the problem of finding-dedicated, trained civilian personnel with the gift of working effectively with their U. S. and foreign counterparts. It recommended "seconding" military personnel to civilian agencies and the use of contract procedures for short term employment of experienced civilians. CIA currently employs these techniques. The DDS believes that their use, plus the basic training given to the Career Officer, should enable the Agency to meet its staffing requirements in this field. Further, the Committee recommended increases in civilian personnel authorizations to permit advance training of personnel for reasonably certain contingencies. CIA's experience in projecting manpower needs for contingency activities and in holding specialized personnel for long periods of inactivity pending contingency use has not always been a profitable one.

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(Intelligence)

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CIA Member:

Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

A. General

1. Committee IV found no grave inadequacies in the intelligence programs in support of the counterinsurgency effort. However, General Taylor has stated, in his "Areas of Possible Deficiencies," that intelligence bearing on internal conditions in emerging countries in which we are primarily interested is generally inadequate. The Committee, therefore, identified certain areas in which more coordination of effort would be profitable and a number of specific deficiencies that require correction.

2. The Committee praised the intelligence agencies for their flexibility of approach and receptivity to critical appraisal of the U. S. intelligence programs.

B. Intelligence Community Matters

3. The Committee found less than full exploitation of information available in countries vulnerable to insurgency--by both collectors in the field and production elements in Washington. Its recommendations for fuller utilization of field reporting sources and intelligence production agencies include:

a. Increased use of MAAG, AID and USIA reporting sources on outlying areas. General Taylor extended this to include "every official American" abroad.

b. More comment and appraisal on field reporting on insurgency matters, especially by Mission Chiefs. General Taylor broadened this to the need to impress Ambassadors with their responsibilities for intelligence programs.

c. General Taylor recommended that for local in-country purposes should be exploited to a greater extent.

d. Improvement in the personnel resources of intelligence production elements in Washington, particularly INR

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and DIA, to permit adequate exploitation of the yield from intelligence collection for counterinsurgency purposes.

e. Further study of the use of centralized analytical teams, supported by computer technology, to determine the precise areas of their applicability--for indicator systems-- to the counterinsurgency programs.

f. Intelligence agencies should develop and adopt specific programs to ensure that close and friendly contact is maintained with senior grade and promising young foreign military officers, especially in the intelligence field, who have been trained in the U. S.

C. Other Intelligence Agencies' Matters

4. DIA should initiate a study to determine the optimum management procedures for the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program.

5. DIA should include insurgency Order of Battle in its existing OB quarterly.

6. The physical separation of DIA intelligence-producing components complicates the production of current intelligence in DIA.

7. Proposals to reduce service attache strength in insurgency-sensitive areas should be affected only after careful scrutiny of their effect on the collection of intelligence on insurgency. General Taylor recommended extending and improving their use.

8. The weekly CIA Intelligence Report prepared for the SIG, be a coordinated national intelligence document.

9. The Priority National Intelligence Objectives should contain a separate objective on insurgency without geographical limitations.

CIA Comments and Action

A. Intelligence Community Matters

1. The DDP and DDI concur that additional information from outlying areas vulnerable to insurgencies would be most useful and

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welcome from MAAG, AID and USIA reporting sources. They believe that State should be encouraged to levy and enforce reporting requirements on AID and USIA and that Defense should make intelligence reporting explicitly a part of the MAAG missions. (NOTE: Such reporting is now permitted based on local arrangements between the Senior Defense Attache and the Chief, MAAG.) State has reported to the SIG that, in accordance with recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Secretary of State has taken measures to emphasize to the Chiefs of Mission their responsibilities in furtherance of U. S. foreign intelligence objectives. As a result, State has reported that there has been a serious and critical review at overseas posts of intelligence information collection by foreign service officers and of the coordination of activities of all other agencies represented at the posts.

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2. General Taylor's recommendation concerning the local exploitation of [] information was made subsequent to decisions by the DCI to augment [] other developments in the Consolidated Cryptologic Program which, in effect, overtake his recommendation. As a matter of principle, CIA believes that:

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a. Country teams need intelligence from Headquarters based on an all-source effort, including Comint.

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3. The DDS has commented that personnel recruitment techniques currently appear adequate to meet the staffing requirements of CIA's counterinsurgency operations. The DDI believes that the personnel resources of the intelligence production offices are adequate to exploit insurgency information for purposes appropriate to the Agency's mission. The DDI does not believe it desirable to focus on insurgency intelligence as a separate intelligence production field. On research in counterinsurgency, CIA is supporting, through the Foreign Area Research Committee, the State Department effort to treat external research on insurgency in regional subcommittees, not as a unique speciality. Also the DDI is participating in the study of the use of centralized analytical teams supported by computer data systems.

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B. Other Intelligence Agencies' Matters

5. Maintaining contact with foreign military officers who have been trained in the U. S. is primarily a job for Defense attaches and MAAG personnel.

[REDACTED]

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6. With regard to the service attaches, Secretary Ball has asked Deputy Secretary Vance to see that General Taylor's proposal is considered in DIA's current review of attache staffing.

C. CIA Matters

7. The DDI does not believe that the weekly Intelligence Report for the SIG need be a "coordinated national intelligence document". At the request of the SIG, the Intelligence Report is no longer limited to "major current insurgency situations" but rather attempts to forewarn the SIG of developing situations in countries or areas where there are signs of potential insurgency or crisis. Coordinated intelligence on current insurgencies is published in the Weekly Central Intelligence Bulletin, National Intelligence Estimates and other intelligence memoranda.

8. The PNIO's now contain an objective on the capabilities, intentions and effort of foreign governments to wage subversion in other countries.